Bureaucratic-Disobedience and Civilian Control of the Military

• In Event: Civil-Military Relations in a Changing Society: Institutions and Interests

Abstract

Clashes between elected officials and bureaucrats have been a prominent feature of US politics in recent years, sparking renewed interest in bureaucratic-disobedience. These echo ongoing discussions about civilian control among civil-military relations scholars. A common understanding of the ideal of civilian control stipulates that civilian have the right to be wrong, particularly when it comes to political questions. This article examines the justification and extent of this understanding of the ideal and argues that existing conceptions fall short of their justifications under certain extreme conditions of democratic backsliding. Using the example of US Military leadership in the final months of the Trump administration, and drawing on work on bureaucratic-disobedience, the article argues that some political orders merit disobedience. Namely, when facing orders to undermine democratic institutions, militaries and their leaders should eschew strict obedience in favor of the democratic principles that ground the demand for civilian control. This argument contributes to debates about democratic civilian control and emerging discussions of bureaucratic-disobedience.

Author

• Avishay Ben Sasson-Gordis, Harvard University