Civilian Praetorianism & Post-coup Personalization

• In Event: Civil-Military Relations in a Changing Society: Institutions and Interests

Abstract

Under what conditions do successful coups produce political orders defined by personalist leaders? Recent years have seen increased scholarly attention on post-coup regime trajectories. While these efforts have largely focused on explaining democratic transitions after a coup, few studies have sought to explain distinct post-coup non-democratic outcomes - such as personalization. This study uses the concept of civilian praetorianism - the process in which civilians instigate and/or consolidate military coups - to explain post-coup personalism. Specifically, I argue that coups primarily backed by civilians outside the center of state power are more likely to produce both the opportunity and incentives for personalization in the emergent regime. Using novel cross-sectional, time-series data on civilian involvement in all successful military coups between 1950-2017, I find strong support for my expectation. I probe the plausibility of the argument on illustrative case studies of post-coup trajectories in Sudan (1969) and Iraq (1958). The findings suggest that contrary to popular approaches to coups - which largely center the power and preferences of soldiers - the varieties of civilian involvement in coups can have long-term ramifications for a country’s political development.

Author

• Salah Ben Hammou, Rice University