Migration Opportunities and the Impacts of Civilian Protests in Civil Wars

• In Event: Dynamics of Protest and Mass Mobilization

Abstract

Why do civilians engage in risky protests in the midst of civil wars, and how do such protests influence the strategies of armed belligerents? Existing research has revealed that civilians---far from being passive victims---can organize peaceful protests to speak out in armed conflicts. These protests sometimes succeed in swaying the behaviors of armed actors, but in many other cases protests often invoke violent retaliation. I develop a formal model to study how local migration opportunities affect the relationship between wartime protests and the behaviors of armed actors. Here, local out-migration options exert countervailing effects on the impact of protests: civilians with low affinity for the ruling armed group have more incentives to protest, but are also more likely to flee if the situation becomes dire. The model shows that civilians are more likely to protest against the incumbent armed group when they dislike the status quo but cannot easily flee from the area. However, it is only when the oppositional armed group is sufficiently strong but not too strong that protests can function as a strategic signal by civilians. Empirically, I find evidence of a spatial and temporal correlation between wartime protests and battles for territory. Whereas the previous literature views wartime civilian protests as a consequence of battle-induced grievances, then, my paper thus shows how civilians strategically use their voice to survive in armed conflicts.

Author

• Nguyen Thao Ha, Vanderbilt University