Coercion versus Imposition in International Politics

• In Event: The Effectiveness of Coercion

Abstract

“There is a difference between taking what you want and making someone give it to you” (Schelling 1966). This study explores whether states more often make gains by coercion or imposition. It explains why this is a fundamental question for understanding international politics. It rethinks Thomas Schelling’s classic distinction between brute force and coercion to develop a typology of imposition strategies. It theorizes that imposition strategies generally have the advantage over coercion strategies because coercion suffers from a compliance-dependence disadvantage (Sullivan 2012). For a combination of seven strategic, domestic political, and psychological reasons, it is difficult to get leaders to capitulate to coercive threats. It then surveys how frequently states have revised the status quo in their favor using coercion and imposition by examining how states have acquired territory, changed foreign regimes, and ended nuclear programs.

Author

• Dan Altman, Georgia State University