International Regime Complexity and Emergent Institutions of Refugee Protection

• In Event: International Organization, Human Rights, and Migration Policy

Abstract

Why do states that have not committed to international and domestic laws of refugee protection, nevertheless extend protection to refugees? I refer to this phenomenon as the non-signatory puzzle, and explain it by focusing on two non-signatory protection-granting states: Bangladesh and Malaysia. The paper attempts to go beyond the standard explanations in migration studies that utilize macro factors like ‘liberalness’ and examines the actual deliberation over policies surrounding refugees among state officials and UN officials. Through 136 in-depth interviews with policy-makers and focus-group discussions with refugees, I show how these policy deliberations frequently lead to a strategy of ‘regime yoking.’ Regime yoking involves attempts by state actors to shift out of the refugee-management framework provided by the refugee regime by inviting multiple international agencies (i.e. not solely UNHCR) to jointly administer refugee groups in the country. While the intention behind such a strategy is usually to increase the state’s veto power over UNHCR, the strategy effectively positions the state at the intersection of multiple regimes and can in fact prevent states from taking punitive measures against refugees. The resultant institutions of refugee management that emerge out of this complex system are novel and often secure protection for refugees in ways that are dissimilar to those stipulated by the refugee regime.

Author

• Tauhid Bin Kashem, University of California, Irvine