Local Incentives in China's Maritime Patrol Patterns in Offshore Disputes

• In Event: Chinese Naval Power

Abstract

This paper examines the motives behind China’s coast guard activities in offshore disputes, challenging the traditional macro-level explanations such as power shifts or internal stability. It posits that local agencies' financial and promotional incentives, such as imposing fines on non-compliant fishing vessels and fulfilling job quotas, are key drivers. Using original weekly data on China's maritime patrols near the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands since 2012, the study reveals two significant patterns. First, the timing of China’s fishing bans aligns closely with spikes in patrol activities. Second, patrol frequency decreases significantly during major diplomatic summits that involve Chinese top leaders, but only in the disputed islands’ territorial waters (within 12 nautical miles). In contrast, these summits have no effect on patrol activities in the contiguous zone (between 12 and 24 nautical miles). Since patrol activities in contiguous zones are considered much less provocative, and thus unlikely to disrupt the diplomatic environment, this suggests that local agencies align their actions with national interests only selectively, aligning with national interests in sensitive situations like major diplomatic events, while otherwise prioritizing local interests. These insights highlight the role of local agency incentives in directing China's maritime strategies in contested areas.

Authors

• Frances Yaping Wang, Colgate University

• Chen Wang, University of Idaho