Cycle of Revenge: The Source and Consequence of Revenge Motive

• In Event: Public Opinion towards Conflict and Cooperation in International Relations

Abstract

What truly drives the preference for retaliation: deterrence or a more visceral desire for revenge? What characteristics of international crises are most likely to trigger public desire for revenge? Moreover, does retaliation deter adversaries or provoke a cycle of conflict? Distinct from security-based motives, the desire for revenge seeks not deterrence or material gain but primarily aims to inflict pain upon the adversary. This paper forwards two main arguments: (1) The desire for revenge is primarily caused by ingroup suffering. (2) Far from being a deterrent, military retaliation often ensnares nations in a cycle of revenge. I tested these arguments at the individual and state levels using a survey experiment and a large-N study of Militarized Interstate Disputes between 1816 and 2010. The empirical findings not only bolster the revenge theory but also challenge the long-held belief that military retaliation operates within the logic of deterrence and reputation for resolve. These findings challenge conventional wisdom regarding the deterrence model, particularly the 'reputation for resolve' theory, and offer a psychological explanation for the onset and persistence of international rivalries.

Author

• Xunchao Zhang, Stanford University