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Why do some autocratic regimes lose their power, whereas many others do not? To answer this question, I argue that membership in Regional Organizations (ROs) with predominant autocratic states facilitate the survival of authoritarian regimes by curtailing democratic influence, consolidating authoritarian rules, and protecting incumbents against democratic challenges. Existing research has concentrated on how membership in more democratic ROs can bolster democratic prospects. Recent studies reveal a record number of 42 countries experiencing autocratization, signaling a potential third wave of such transitions and suggesting varying international preferences in terms of cooperation. While previous research has significantly contributed to comprehending the connection between the regional aspects of authoritarian resilience, they did not focus on how the membership in ROs itself can actually affect the likelihood of autocratic regime survival. Also, even though a few studies are conducted, they largely rely on qualitative case-based research.
This article explores how regional organizations can affect their regime stability. I consider how parallel mechanisms might play a role in solidifying authoritarian control, thereby diminishing the likelihood of autocratic regime failures. Thus, I concentrate on how membership in Regional Organizations can help to strengthen authoritarian survival politics.
This is because RO membership can stabilize regimes during crises by acting as a transformative force through the theory of rational institutionalism, influencing member-state’s behavior, identities, and interests, potentially affecting the durability of authoritarian regimes. Rational institutionalism starts with the presumption, for simplicity, that states, as the primary actors in world politics, employ international organizations to establish social structures conducive to their joint objectives, such as generating collective goods, navigating prisoner's dilemma scenarios, and resolving coordination challenges. Rational institutionalists emphasize four notable features: 1) a set of behavior, 2) an image of politics, 3) strategic interactions, 4) a distinctive approach to the formulation of institutions. In this study, I begin with the presumption that authoritarian regimes possess a strong inclination to consolidate their power and curb potential democratic challengers. In regional organizations dominated by authoritarian members, cooperation takes various forms. It is important to note that I do not assert RO membership as a sole factor responsible for survival but argue that it contributes significantly to successful crisis resolution and stability. This paper contends that RO membership provides assurance to authoritarian leaders facing potential power loss during a transition to democracy and domestic challenges. Autocracies face intent threats from domestic forces, including the potential for popular upheavals, oppositional actors, or intra-elite coalitions seeking to challenge the existing power distribution. Consequently, autocratic regimes strategically devise domestic survival strategies to navigate and mitigate these multifaceted threats. In regional organizations where autocratic members are dominant, these organizations can function as protective cartels, offering external support to further these consolidation objectives.
To investigate how membership in ROs affects the survival of authoritarian regimes, I conducted survival analysis and test the model implication with data from 280 authoritarian regimes in 4,587 countries from 1946 to 2010. I used an updated version of Geddes's (2003) dataset on authoritarian regimes, as compiled by Wright (2008). The survival of an autocratic regime can be measured through the possible outcomes of the regime's fall, which encompass autocratic regime breakdown due to autocratic replacements, and autocratic system breakdown arising from democratization.
The main findings suggest that membership in ROs with predominant autocratic member states substantially reduces the risk of regime failure. Specifically, belonging to a RO with a predominant presence of an autocratic member-state increases the likelihood of maintaining regime survival. This paper considers several directions for future research. First, regional organizations have a variety of rules and institutions that have many effects on autocracies’ domestic politics. Also, there exists a rich field for further research, particularly at the country level. While my research has successfully established a statistical correlation between membership in authoritarian ROs and regime survival in autocracies, revealing expected patterns of cooperation, there remains a need for more in-depth investigations into the nuanced interactions between external support from these organizations and domestic political dynamics.