Balancing Long and Short-Term Goals: Survey Evidence from China-Taiwan Relations

• In Event: War, Leaders, and Public Opinion

Abstract

How can countries balance long-term and short-term coercive goals? Most studies conceive of coercion as a one-time event. A few studies have considered how a long-run commitment problem can undermine short-term coercive goals, but no one has yet explored how the need to balance long-term and short-term coercive goals affects a country’s signaling strategy and coercive success. Does a long-term threat undermine the credibility of short-term assurances? Or do short-term assurances undermine long-term threats? We study these questions in the context of relations between China and Taiwan. China must balance its long-term goal of compelling Taiwan to reintegrate with its shorter-term coercive goals, such as deterring foreign state visits and the acquisition of new military capabilities. Using a nationally representative, scenario-based survey experiment fielded in Taiwan, we explore how different combinations of long-term and short-term threats and assurances affect China’s credibility and support for concessions to China among the Taiwanese public.

Authors

• Roseanne McManus, Pennsylvania State University

• Yang Yang, Pennsylvania State University

• Lingbo ZHAO, Pennsylvania State University