Time Horizons and Foreign Policy Termination

• In Event: War, Leaders, and Public Opinion

Abstract

Despite the importance of time preferences on resolve and commitments in international relations, few works address the origins of these preferences or directly test their impact on decision-making and policy outcomes. This problem is apparent when we consider the analysis of coercive foreign policies: why do leaders uphold policies that do not have a track record of success? When do foreign policies finally end? This dissertation addresses this by considering the conditions under which leaders have preferences for long- versus short-time horizons. To systematize the origins of time horizons, I present a theory of policy termination by identifying specific conditions that predict the conditions under which time preferences (long vs short) emerge: leader culpability and satisfaction with the current policy. Leaders are culpable if international or domestic audiences can hold them accountable by credibly threatening their political survival (through elections or regime change). This situational condition influences the structural costs associated with pursuing a certain policy and the political consequences generated by deviating from the status quo. Leader satisfaction, on the other hand, is a dispositional condition that captures individual incentives to continue implementing a foreign policy, including ideological, reputational, and personal motivations. I argue that leaders possess short time horizons when they are not culpable and are dissatisfied with the existing policy. In turn, these short time horizons result in policy termination. I test this theory using (a) survey experiments to isolate the direct effects of individual preferences and levels of culpability on time preferences for policy commitment and (b) leveraging cross-national data on regime and leader attributes to construct a generalizable measure of time horizons. This project contributes directly to the way in which international relations scholars understand commitment problems and resolve, and specifies the mechanisms by which leaders are constrained in foreign policy decision-making. Longer-time horizons may not necessarily produce policies that are geared towards conflict resolution and the threshold to break path dependency in foreign policy is much higher than previously considered. In the absence of critical internal and external incentives to change time preferences states should be prepared to be in it for the long haul, not necessarily due to the costs of war, but due to the absence of incentives to withdraw.

Author

• Maryum Alam, The Ohio State University