Electoral Volatility, Government Turnover, and Satisfaction with Democracy

• In Event: Volatility and Policy-Making

Abstract

Party systems and elections in established democracies are now characterized by fragmentation and volatility. At the same time, we have become less likely to see complete turnovers in government after elections are held. The parties that comprise governments often likely to stay in power despite changes in party vote shares. We explore the consequences of these trends by investigating the relationship between electoral volatility, government turnover, and satisfaction with democracy. We first hypothesize that lower levels of government turnover can decrease satisfaction with democracy, particularly among the supporters of persistent opposition parties who become consistent electoral losers. Secondly, we hypothesize that this relationship will be heighted when electoral volatility is higher. Specifically, we expect satisfaction with democracy to decrease as government composition becomes less responsive to changes in election results. We draw on data from ParlGov on government composition and turnover, party ideological positions from the Comparative Manifesto Project, and survey data included in the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) to examine our expectations for 20 established democracies from 1950 to 2021. The results generally support the expectation that lower levels of government turnover is linked to less satisfaction with democracy. This relationship is stronger (1) for persistent electoral losers and (2) when electoral volatility is higher. Our findings bear important implications for the current state of politics in established democracies. In an electoral context characterized by fragmentation and volatility, government stability may decrease democratic satisfaction.

Authors

• Robin E. Best, Binghamton University (SUNY)

• Hyoungrohk Chu, Binghamton University, SUNY