When Do States Pursue Leadership Decapitation?

• In Event: Poster Session: Dynamics of International Conflict and Competition

Abstract

When do states choose to pursue leadership decapitation in interstate warfare? In this paper I describe how the decision to deliberately target the leadership of another state is driven by six factors. The first is the targeting state’s ability to do so, while the second is the degree to which an opposing leader constitutes a center of gravity. As these two factors increase, states are more likely to pursue decapitation. On the other hand, there are four factors that decrease the likelihood that a state chooses to decapitate. These include various fears, such as triggering severe retaliation, galvanizing the opposing state, violating international norms, or creating vacuum effects by destabilizing a state or losing the ability to deescalate a conflict. This paper uses a mixture of quantitative and qualitative methods to examine this issue using a set of leadership decapitations that occurred in interstate warfare between 1823 and 2003. First, the paper uses quantitative methods to examine the decision to decapitate. Next, the paper uses a most similar case pairing to examine the differing decisions to pursue decapitation against Saddam Hussein’s regime in the 1991 Gulf War as opposed to the 2003 Invasion of Iraq. The results indicate that states that have the ability to decapitate are more likely to do so, especially when facing off against leaders with more centralized authority and decision-making processes. Additionally, states are unlikely to pursue decapitation against states with nuclear weapons, suggesting that they may fear reprisal for the act. This carries important implications for how states will choose strategic targets in interstate warfare.

Author

• Jeremy Sunshine, Duke University