Major Power Diplomacy and Wedge Strategies of Concessions

• In Event: Poster Session: International Security Theory and Concepts

Abstract

Alliance politics is one of the most important aspects in major power competition.
One important way for a major power to increase its relative power is to drive a wedge
in a competing alignment. Why and when does a major power seek to drive a wedge
in a competing alliance? I propose a theory of strategic calculus in this paper and
argue that a major power is likely to seek to drive a wedge in the rival competing
alignment by offering foreign aid to a protege of the competing alignment when the
latter experiences a rapid deterioration in its relations with its patron. While using
carrot-based wedge strategies may not further deteriorate the relations between the
rival patron and its protege, it might delay the recovery of the relations. I test my
theory on major power rivalry dyads and find empirical support for my argument on
a set of directed dyad-year observations between 1960 and 2010.

Author

• Hankyeul Yang