Resistance under Global Political Injustice

• In Event: Political Theories of Resistance

Abstract

This paper argues that, in addition to substantive forms of global injustice (e.g., climate injustice, global distributive injustice), individuals also suffer from a global political injustice (or what is sometimes called “global democratic deficit”): despite our interconnectedness, the demos in existing democracies is defined by territorial boundaries. The existence of global political injustice provides an alternative grounding for individuals who suffer from global injustice to engage in permissible resistance.

In this first part of the paper, I will provide an argument for why we face a global political injustice. I argue that democratic values should place a side constraint on who can be excluded from having a vote: if an exclusion violates a certain democratic value, it seems to provide a prima facie reason for why such exclusion is undemocratic. This logic allows us to argue that the exclusion of women from voting is undemocratic because it violates the democratic value of political equality. As some democratic theorists (e.g., Wilson, 2021; Lovett and Zuehl, 2022) argue, the value of democracy also lies in the value of individual autonomy: we should have a democratic say in matters that affect our autonomy. By the same logic, the value of individual autonomy should place a side constraint on who can be excluded from having a democratic say. Now, we live in a globalized world where the laws and policies of foreign states are affecting and will continue to affect our autonomy on an increasingly frequent basis. However, we only have a democratic say on laws and policies of the state that we live in (for those living in a democracy) and are excluded from having a voice in laws and policies of all other states. By excluding them, existing states do not fully respect the autonomy of non-citizens and this leads to a global political injustice.

In the second part of the paper, I will argue that global democratic disobedience is a specifically fitting response to this global political injustice. In existing literature, democratic disobedience among citizens is a specifically fitting response to injustices within a state because it carries important democratic values. For instance, Habermas (1985) sees civil disobedience as a litmus test for the democratic constitutional state. David Lefkowitz (2007, p. 202) also argues that citizens’ restricted right to engage in public disobedience arises from what he calls a ‘morally justified claim to political authority.’ I hope to expand this line of argument to global democratic disobedience and the participants to include non-citizens. I believe that global democratic disobedience can be a particularly fitting response to the problem of disenfranchisement by allowing disenfranchised individuals to have a democratic voice.

This paper contributes to the literature by expanding the scope of appropriate participants of democratic disobedience to include non-citizens. This can be contrasted with the methodological nationalism of many existing literatures on democratic disobedience. Traditional theories of democratic disobedience restrict their focus to a citizenship model and fail to capture the globalized nature of our collective political struggles. For instance, John Rawls states that “[t]he problem of civil disobedience, as I shall interpret it, arises only within a more or less just democratic state for those citizens who recognize and accept the legitimacy of the constitution” (Rawls, 1971, p. 319, italics added). In a similar vein, Ronald Dworkin (1985, p. 105) sees participants in civil disobedience as “accept[ing] the fundamental legitimacy of both government and community” and “act[ing] to acquit rather than to challenge their duty as citizens.” However, if I am right that there is a global political injustice, there is no principled reason for assuming that the primary participants of democratic disobedience have to be the citizens. Engaging in global democratic disobedience movements can be a fitting way for affected non-citizens to respond to their disenfranchisement, as these movements provide an avenue for non-citizens to democratically express their dissent against the relevant laws or policies that affect their autonomy.

Author

• Elaine Yim, Princeton University