How Autocrats’ Blame Avoidance Strategies Backfire: The Cases of Vietnam & China

• In Event: Central-Local and State-Society Relations in China and Vietnam

Abstract

Amid policy crises, authoritarian regimes frequently deploy state propaganda to shift responsibility onto local authorities—a strategic move aimed at safeguarding the regime's legitimacy. However, research on blame attribution and contentious politics under authoritarian rule suggests that while citizens may initially attribute blame to local authorities for the crisis and ensuing grievances, they simultaneously expect the central government to assume responsibility for addressing these issues. This presents a dilemma for central authorities: balancing a blame-shifting strategy with fulfilling their obligation to resolve crises. We argue that state propaganda, initially effective in directing blame toward local authorities, may yield transient acceptance among citizens who perceive the issues as localized. However, the sustainability of this strategy depends on the central authorities' capacity and willingness to resolve the crises. Prolonged grievances and unsuccessful activism at the local level, without resolution from the central government, may contribute to a gradual shift in citizens' attribution of blame, ultimately redirecting it toward the central government. Eventually, the crisis comes to be perceived as a national issue requiring significant regime reforms as the solution. To empirically examine this theory, we employ online survey experiments conducted in Vietnam and China, focusing specifically on land disputes.

Authors

• Mai Thanh Truong, Marquette University

• Zhihang Ruan, Hunter College, CUNY