A Theory of Cost-Sharing Negotiations of Military Alliances

• In Event: Poster Session: International Security Theory and Concepts

Abstract

Why do some protege share the costs of alliances with their patron but others do not? The literature suggests that alliances can deter aggression through a costly signaling mechanism. In reality, however, many proteges often agree to pay substantive costs of their alliances, which makes alliances cheaper for a patron and may derail the signaling. To explain this gap, I develop a formal model in which allied countries negotiate the cost-sharing of their alliance under the shadow of crisis bargaining. The result shows that when the uncertainty of a patron's preference is high, (a) failed negotiations signal resolve and bring peace, (b) successful negotiations signal being unresolved but help avoid a large concession, and (c) alliance termination with a limited demand can signal resolve and lead to peace without a large concession. Empirical records of cost-sharing negotiations in the US-Japan and US-South Korea alliances are explained through these mechanisms.

Author

• Yuji Masumura, The University of Texas at Austin