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With the global expansion of international law, international courts are more frequently confronting democratic backsliding. As international courts provide access to ordinary citizens and are difficult for aspiring autocrats to capture, they are an appealing avenue to bring legal challenges on potential violations of democratic norms. Yet, like their domestic counterparts, international courts lack the ability to enforce their decisions and rely on public support to hold governments accountable. We argue that international courts provide a coordination mechanism for citizens when their domestic institutions are manipulated. By leveraging support for their decision-making accrued over time and the benefits of membership in the international organization, international courts may be uniquely positioned to pressure governments to change their behavior. We test our expectations in the European Union and its Court of Justice — the international court where we would most likely expect an effect — with a survey experiment conducted in advance of the 2022 Hungarian election.