Brook No Compromise: How to Negotiate a United Front

• In Event: Factional Conflict within Institutions

Abstract

Resolving factional conflict is crucial to successful policymaking. Political parties, coalition governments, and authoritarian elites must all overcome internal disagreements in order to survive. In these situations, why do some factions prevail while other fall into line? And why do factions sometimes stalemate to the detriment of both? I study factional behavior with a model where two groups are faced with two possible policy reforms. Each prefers a different reforms, but both must commit to the same one to overturn the mutually unfavorable status quo. Importantly, neither group is sure at the outset whether their counterpart would prefer their preferred reform to the status quo, i.e., whether they are willing to compromise. I show that the behavior of groups who are willing to compromise hinges on their ability to infer their counterpart's type on the basis of prolonged inaction. The more certain a group is that their counterpart is strategically and not inadvertently delaying, the more willing they are to act preemptively. When information is leaked that reveal one group's type, it hinders the mechanism whereby the leaked group learns about its opponent. For this reason, the threat of leaks reduces the incidence of avoidable miscoordination and correspondingly increases welfare.

Author

• Elaine Yao, Princeton University