Bargaining in the Shadow of Bureaucracy

• In Event: Factional Conflict within Institutions

Abstract

The authority of the President to unilaterally enact policy initiatives has been subject to debate for decades. Similarly, recent Supreme Court decisions have emphasized the legislative powers of Congress as the primary force for policy change. However, regardless of which institution pursues policy change---the President or Congress---the bureaucracy ultimately implements it. Moreover, bureaucratic implementation is subject to ex post review by, e.g., the judiciary. I develop a model of policy change in which a Proposer pursues policy change but must satisfy a Veto Player. The bureaucracy implements all policy changes by investing in quality and a Reviewer has the ability to reverse final policy once it has been implemented. I show how the shadow of bureaucratic implementation shapes policymaking incentives for both Proposer and the Veto Player. Then I discuss the core results in light of the President and Congress in the role of Proposer with a focus on how relative policy authority shapes the desirability of the President's ability to 'move first' and shape policy change.

Author

• Ian R. Turner, Yale University