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In recent years, the world has been witnessing a retreat in democracy (Vanessa et al., 2022). Two key issues arise in this context. Leaders with autocratic tendencies have engaged in illiberal practices that undermined democracy in their countries. Turkey’s Erdogan, Correa in Ecuador, Venezuela under Chavez, Hungary under the leadership of Orban, India under Modi, albeit to different extent, have engaged in attempts to subvert democracy in their countries. Second, citizens’ beliefs and attitudes play a critical role in the vitality of the democratic system. According to theories of democratic accountability, voters play a role in sanctioning democratic incumbents that try to subvert democracy (Auerbach, 2022). Nevertheless, voters in recent years have shown apathy or acquiescence to the subversion of democracy by incumbents (Vanessa et al., 2022).
Such a decline in citizens’ willingness to sanction illiberal practices in democracies is puzzling when viewed through the lens of the literature on democratic accountability. This paper investigates the phenomenon of democratic backsliding. The paper will focus on the micro level by shedding the light on citizens’ failure to punish or sanction undemocratic leaders. The main research question that the thesis tackles is why citizens do not punish or sanction leaders that subvert democracy and continue to vote for incumbents that commit undemocratic practices.
The study aims to focus on the impact of the increasing aspects of minoritarian democracy (specifically the institutionalization of minority right) and the increase of affective polarization on citizens' willingness to sanction undemocratic behaviour. The paper will depend on mixed method of speech analysis of leaders as well as quantitative data. The time framework of the study will extend from 1998 until 2018. The data will be administered via V-DEM project, Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) and other sources. It will include ‘democratic countries’ that witnessed democratic backsliding in the world.
The paper employs the mechanism of the social identity theory in the political arena which suggests that any type of group membership causes a negative bias towards the out-group member and a positive evaluation of the in-group members (Tajfel et al., 1971). In relation to political tolerance, affective polarization also triggers partisan biases as each group views the other as the enemy and an existential threat (Iyengar, 2012). Affectively polarized individuals would push to limit and not to extend the other’s party rights to speak freely, vote or protest. They would view it psychologically difficult to punish a co partisan and vote for the ‘enemy’ even if he commits actions that would threaten the corner stone of democracy (Orhan, 2021).
As previously mentioned, negative emotions towards the out-group members (opposing parties) would trigger affectively polarized citizens to dehumanize their opponents and question their legitimacy and lose trust in counter majoritarian institutions (Gibson and Caledeira, 2003). Research suggests that majority of citizens tend to oppose minoritarian values and institution. Those minoritarian or counter majoritarian institutions endorse and protect minority righty which troubles large segments of the population (Gibson, 2008). This resonates with the literature on political tolerance suggesting that extending political and civil rights to ethnic and political minorities is not accepted by large segments of the population even in established democracies (Duch and Gibson, 1992).