Tocqueville and Dewey on Realizing Democracy’s Epistemic Potential

• In Event: Education, Commerce, and Democracy

Abstract

In response to perceived crises of democracy, 21st century political theorists of democracy have argued for a reimagining of democratic institutions. Yet major contributions on this subject point to important questions about democratic life that they do not answer. For example, in Open Democracy, Hélène Landemore advances a new paradigm she terms “open democracy.” At the core of this paradigm is the ideal of the “open mini-public,” which consists of a large, randomly selected assembly of people gathered for the purpose of agenda-setting and lawmaking. She calls this “open democracy” because, in contrast to representative democracy, which has historically been founded on the exclusion of everyday people, it is open to ordinary citizens. As such, it is better able to take advantage of the allegedly superior epistemic capacity of diverse groups. It is also “open” in the sense that its distinctive virtue is open-mindedness, a character trait that she describes as both nurtured by the functioning of open democracy but also necessary for it to work.

However, Landemore’s pathbreaking work on reimagining democracy leaves unexplored what sorts of social conditions are requisite for the thriving of a democracy premised on the citizenry’s epistemic power. Insight into these themes can be obtained through examination of Alexis de Tocqueville and John Dewey. Both authors observe latent epistemic potential in democracy. However, each worry that other trends in modern politics risk undermining that potential. These theorists highlight ways in which developing and sustaining the capacity for truth-seeking is not simply a matter of individual responsibility but also requires attention to how the structure of society shapes us as inquirers. In addition to responding to unanswered questions that Landemore’s work raises, this aspect of Tocqueville and Dewey’s thought can be put into dialogue with Danielle Allen’s Justice by Means of Democracy, which contends that renovating democracy requires taking more seriously relations of power in the economic and social spheres as well as the political one.

I first examine Tocqueville and Dewey’s accounts of the factors that obstruct the realization of democratic people’s epistemic potential and show how these differing accounts are complementary. Tocqueville warns of the “tyranny of the majority over thought.” Dewey, by contrast, sees one of the obstacles to the realization of democracy’s epistemic potential as residing not with majorities but with minorities, and specifically powerful governmental or commercial interests who use propaganda to direct people for their own ends. Placing these authors in dialogue, Tocqueville’s attention to how mass society can engender conformity supplements Dewey’s neglect of this issue. Similarly, Dewey’s analysis of how the racial and class stratifications of mass society obstruct the realization of democracy’s epistemic potential remedies a limitation of Tocqueville’s understanding democracy. Importantly, Tocqueville sees these challenges to democracy as endogenous to democracy as a regime type, while Dewey regards them as the product of imperfectly realized democratic commitments.

I also examine Tocqueville and Dewey’s shared sense that the unsettled and transitional state of moral and intellectual authority in their times impedes the functioning of collective intelligence. Their accounts of this theme diverge sharply, with Tocqueville endorsing the necessity and desirability of preserving dogmatic religious beliefs, with Dewey categorically rejecting the merit of unquestioned social values. Despite their marked disagreement, their shared emphasis on this issue illuminates that culture matters for the success of epistemic democracy because of the role it plays in forming people’s habits of mind. This raises questions about how best to instantiate popular rule in a country as vast and diverse as the modern United States and indicates the continued merit of decentralized forms of decision-making.

Author

• Alec Arellano, Occidental College