Three Is a Crowd: Information and Electoral Coordination in Argentina

• In Event: Voter Preferences in Multiparty Systems

Abstract

We explore how information about candidates' electoral support influences voters' choices, mobilization decisions, and, ultimately, electoral outcomes. Information about candidates’ relative electoral support is crucial for successfully coordinating around a Duvergerian equilibrium, but accurate, reliable, and consistent information on candidates’ expected vote shares is rarely available, especially in small district where polls are prohibitively expensive. In this paper, we exploit the fact that the Open, Mandatory, and Simultaneous Primary Elections employed in Argentina since 2011 "de facto" worked as a massive poll of voters’ preferences. Using data from 135 municipalities in the province of Buenos Aires across seven election cycles (2011-2023), we document three main findings. First, the narrower the margin between the first- and second-placed candidate in the primary, the greater the increase in turnout and valid votes between the primary and the general election. Second, the smaller the gap between the first-placed candidate and the runner-up in the primary, the larger the increase in the combined vote share of the top two candidates in the general election. Finally, and also in line with coordination dynamics, the second-placed party in the primary is much more likely than the third-placed one to win the general election. Consistent with theoretical expectations, these effects are stronger in concurrent elections and in smaller municipalities.

Authors

• Adrian Lucardi, ITAM

• Agustin Vallejo, University of Houston

• German Feierherd, Universidad de San Andrés