What Makes a World War? A Structural Analysis of Integration and Power

• In Event: Advances in Bargaining Models of War

Abstract

Why do some conflicts escalate to global war, while others stay contained? At its core, the size of a war, as well as the incentive to start one, depends on expectations about who will join. Those expectations are, in turn, shaped by political economic integration and power relations. I provide a formal model of conflict that accounts for these factors. Using data on international disputes from 1816-2014, I estimate the effect of integration and power asymmetries on the incentives for conflict. The results suggest (1) network spillovers pacify potential joiners of war, reducing its scale and consequently encouraging initial attacks, and (2) countries bandwagon, causing a correlation between power inequality and the expected size of war in equilibrium. The model also facilitates counterfactual experiments of historical and contemporary cases of interest.

Author

• Joseph Ruggiero, Princeton University