How We Assess Threat: Disaggregating Lethality and Capability

• In Event: Rebel Group Behavior in Multi-party Civil Wars

Abstract

A militant group’s organizational and strategic capabilities have become standard predictors for lethality and threat. Yet research defining capability and lethality and examining their differences is sparse in the terrorism and security literature, and their relationship is ambiguous. We propose a conceptual framework that disaggregates what a group can do (power capability)from what it is willing to do (threat capability. Reorienting discussions around these two dimensions would clarify the distinct roles that lethality and capabilities play in assessing threat levels. We apply our model to case studies of the Taliban and Islamic State in Khorasan (IS-K). Before taking power in Afghanistan, the Taliban had higher power capability than IS-K. However, the latter played an outsized role and posed a higher threat because it had a high threat capability and was willing to conduct mass casualty attacks on soft targets. The case studies demonstrate that being capable of conducting lethal attacks does not inevitably lead to increased fatalities – a reality that the current discourse on lethality and capability does not convey.

Authors

• Tricia Bacon, American University

• Hannah Priyanka Chesterton, Catholic University of America