Defending the Status Quo: Regulatory Changes during Rulemaking

• In Event: Bureaucracy and Policy Dynamics: A Comparative Perspective

Abstract

While extensive research explores how interested parties influence rulemaking procedures within America's federal agencies, current literature often neglects the contextual backdrop against which rule amendments are proposed. Most rule proposals are not isolated actions, but rather, attempts to modify existing regulation. This paper identifies the status quo policy for over 1,400 rules spanning 2017 to 2023, employing text analysis to quantify both the initially proposed changes by agencies and the alterations finalized post-comment period. I find that changes made after the comment period account for a small percentage of overall changes to U.S. regulations and that when changes do happen, they predominately move the proposed policy closer to the status quo. Further, I investigate the differential ability of commenters to influence policy change. By linking commenters to their lobbying expenditures, I show that commenters who invest in lobbying, especially lobbying of the agency proposing the rule, are often in support of proposed rules, suggesting that agency initiatives already reflect their preferences. Conversely, well-resourced commenters who oppose proposed rules tend to be more successful than those who do not lobby in overturning proposed changes.

This study not only probes the tangible impact of notice and comment rulemaking on federal regulations but also explores how participatory structures in rulemaking may potentially bias policy outcomes in favor of well-resourced groups, prompting pivotal questions regarding democratic participation and policy evolution in the regulatory process.

Author

• Alexander Love, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill