How Foreign Governments’ Electoral Cycles Affect Their Lobbying of the US?

• In Event: Foreign Policy Meddling

Abstract

How do electoral motivations impact incumbent governments’ use of diplomatic instruments? Existing literature establishes that incumbent governments strategically employ monetary and fiscal policies, security policies, and trade disputes to boost their chances of reelection. This study explores the impact of electoral motivations on a previously unconsidered diplomatic instrument: foreign policy lobbying. It argues that foreign governments strategically escalate their lobbying of the U.S. government in the run-up to elections to improve their prospects for reelection. Lobbying the U.S. can help foreign governments retain power by eliciting policy concessions or U.S. support for elections. Using original data coding the lobbying activities of foreign governments in the US between 2002 and 2018, this study reveals that incumbent foreign governments increase both the tendency to lobby and spending on lobbying during domestic election years and gain electoral advantages from these efforts. The observed patterns remain robust and indicate causal relationships across various sensitivity analyses. While foreign electoral intervention is often portrayed as unwanted interference, this study suggests that some governments actively seek it.

Author

• Yang Yang, Pennsylvania State University