Status Quo Power in Confirmation Bargaining

• In Event: Formal Models of Bureaucratic and Judicial Politics

Abstract

Separation of powers designates the Senate as the primary check on presidents' singular preferences for who will manage the executive branch. Yet, when presidents can choose their own acting appointees to fill vacant positions, they unilaterally determine a new status quo. We argue that the president's strategic selection among different types of acting appointees fundamentally alters the balance of power in confirmation bargaining and ultimately undermines the Senate's function to provide advice and consent. We develop and analyze a new model of confirmation dynamics that explicitly integrates the president's first-mover advantage and the constraint it creates for the Senate's leverage over nomination decisions. We test our empirical expectations using an original, continuous dataset on all acting appointees and nominations spanning six administrations. Our findings offer a new understanding of confirmation decisions and delay that more accurately reflects the full range of the president's unilateral authority in controlling the administrative state.

Authors

• Christina M. Kinane, Yale University

• Lindsey Gailmard, California Institute of Technology