Durable Majority Gerrymanders

• In Event: Redistricting and Representation

Abstract

Partisan gerrymandering is not limited by the federal courts and, while Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act limits racial gerrymandering under specific conditions for now, we are otherwise in an era of unrestricted partisan gerrymandering. To assess the anti-democratic threats of widespread gerrymandering, whereby parties might lock in permanent state legislative majorities, we develop the concept of, and estimation tools for, durable majority gerrymanders. A durable majority gerrymander is an electoral district map that offers an opposing political party a low probability of winning a majority in a legislative chamber in future elections. We use redistricting simulations and election forecasts to estimate each party’s ability to win a durable majority and long-term control of the legislative chamber in all competitive states. We find that the ability to draw maps with durable majority gerrymanders is widespread, with at least one party able to create district maps where a majority of legislative districts can withstand any likely electoral swing; in a non-negligible set of states, either party can lock in such a majority for a full redistricting cycle. The widespread ability to enact durable majorities through gerrymandering alone has grave consequences for representative democracy – unchecked partisan gerrymandering can dramatically limit the chances that both parties can realistically win a legislative majority in almost every state.

Authors

• Maxwell B. Palmer, Boston University

• Benjamin Schneer, Harvard University