Bureaucratic Autonomy of the ILO and League of Nations in World War II

• In Event: Bureaucracy in International Relations I: Bureaucratic Representation

Abstract

When cooperation collapses, how do international organizations respond? Much research has examined IO responses to crises, but not to an utter breakdown in cross-border cooperation – even though many IOs throughout the world have endured civil and international wars. Once it becomes abundantly clear that cooperation has failed, do the IO staff that hang on do so out of loyalty or sinecure, and what are the consequences for subsequent international cooperation? We argue that when IOs are at their most beleaguered, national loyalties draw away staff who tended to view the IO as a source of personal professional gain. The bureaucratic staff that endure, however, are confronted with a unique opportunity where political control by principals is minimal, and their own autonomy is maximized – an appealing prospect for those who aspire to be neutral international civil servants. We test this argument by comparing the fate of the staff in the International Labour Organization (ILO) and the League of Nations during World War II, particularly the more “political” actors with the ones who were selected as international civil servants. While many of the more political staff returned to their home countries, the ILO relocated its secretariat altogether to a “war room” at McGill University in Montreal, while the League remained in a pared down version in Geneva, with many officers working remotely from their home countries. Using archival materials on pensions and indemnities of the staff, we assemble a unique dataset of the wartime employees of the League and ILO and compare their background characteristics to those of staff who resigned in the period.

Authors

• Julia Gray, University of Pennsylvania

• Minju Kim, Syracuse University