Selection or Incentives? Examining Bias in Argentina's Corruption Investigations

• In Event: Enforcement, Redistribution and Stateness

Abstract

This study examines the presence of partisan bias among federal judges and prosecutors in Argentina, specifically in the context of corruption investigations. The 'selection' hypothesis posits that presidents may circumvent legal challenges by strategically appointing partisan judicial officials. Conversely, the 'incentives' hypothesis contends that the risk of sanctions or dismissal dissuades investigations against government officials. Focusing on the prominent Comodoro Py federal court circuit in Buenos Aires, we analyze a comprehensive set of cases to assess the influence of presidential appointments on judicial and prosecutorial bias in corruption cases. We leverage the random assignment of cases to courts, which rotate judges and prosecutors annually, to explore whether officials appointed by the incumbent party investigate opposition politicians more aggressively relative to those affiliated with the incumbent party and if such biases persist post-incumbency. Our findings challenge conventional views of judicial and prosecutorial behavior in developing countries. We observe no partisan bias among judges appointed by the incumbent in cases involving either government or opposition figures. However, prosecutors exhibit favoritism towards their appointing party. We further show that this difference in bias by judiciary actors is driven by selection rather than by a strategic response to career incentives.

Authors

• German Feierherd, Universidad de San Andrés

• Guadalupe Tuñón, Princeton University