Law Enforcement and Political Alignment

• In Event: Mixed Methods in Comparative Politics

Abstract

Law enforcement actors carry sizeable political influence. In this paper, I consider how they can realize their political interests via ties to elected officials and in cases of political alignment by focusing on the case of Brazil. To do so, I first conceptualize the ways in which politicians are connected to law enforcement actors in two ways: 1) as law-enforcement tied politicians (LE-tied), and 2) law enforcement priority politicians (LE-priority). To measure these concepts I draw on fine-grained electoral data and an original dataset of gubernatorial-campaign manifestos. I then hypothesize that LE-tied and LE-priority politicians can better execute on law enforcement interests when they are in situations of political alignment. Building on work that examines the power of partisan alignments and political outcomes at different levels of government, I forward an idea of alignment on the basis on interest group/organization priorities (e.g., the law enforcement interest group). Utilizing an RDD in close electoral races, I examine if municipalities with LE-tied mayors elected in cases of alignment with LE-tied/priority governors see increased investment in prisons and higher rates of imprisonment. I pair this with the qualitative analysis of interviews with public security officials and experts in Brazil conducted via 7 months of fieldwork.

Author

• Isabel Laterzo-Tingley, University of Texas, Austin