Legislating Democracy: When State Legislators Change Access to the Ballot

• In Event: Poster Session: Current and Classical Topics in Political Psychology & State Politics and Policy
  In Poster Session: Poster Session: State Politics and Policy

Abstract

Both the Democratic and Republican parties have come to take clearly defined positions on the issue of voting rights, positions that generally explain state legislative action on election policy. In many respects, the resulting conventional wisdom—that Democrats strive to expand voter access and Republicans work to restrict voter access—reflects previous work suggesting that (1) modifying voting rules shapes how easy it is for voters to participate in elections (Wolfinger and Rosenstone, 1980; Larocca and Klemanski, 2011), (2) political parties shape election law to suit their interests (Karol, 2009; Wang, 2012; Bateman, 2018), and (3) political parties enjoy distinct advantages from different election policies (Oliver, 1996; Karp and Banducci, 2001; Alvarez, Levin and Sinclair, 2012; Burden et al., 2017).

After the 2020 United States general election, which took place amidst a global pandemic, witnessed record levels of voter turnout, and saw unprecedented shifts in how voters cast ballots, state legislatures became deeply involved in addressing how American elections are conducted. Previous research has traditionally aimed to identify the political and demographic contexts in which state legislatures pass new election policies. Yet, we currently know little about what explains legislator behavior on voting rights bills, especially once the content of individual bills, along with their effects on voter access, are accounted for.

To fill this gap, I first take advantage of publicly available legislative trackers that catalog election reform bills proposed and voted on in state legislatures following the 2020 election. Leveraging these data, I explore how factors like electoral competition, constituency demographics, and personal characteristics explain state legislator support for restricting voter access on election bills covering a range of policies. Initial work centered on legislator roll call behavior has focused primarily on support for voter ID bills (e.g., McKee, 2015; Hicks, McKee, and Smith, 2016), a uniquely divisive and salient point of contention in election policy. I find that while the partisan affiliation of a legislator is by far the strongest predictor of how they vote on election bills within the 2021-2022 state legislative sessions, the specific policies (e.g., voter identification, early voting, mail voting) included in each bill shape the extent to which other factors (e.g., electoral threat, racial threat) explain roll call voting patterns.

Yet, state legislative battles over voting rights bills have, at least until recently, been seen as opportunities for compromise (James and Stewart, 2022). What explains the decline in the bipartisanship that once explained election policymaking? Previous work suggests declining cross-party cooperation on election bills can be explained by growing polarization (e.g., Grumbach, 2022) or the strength of interest groups pushing cohesive partisan agendas (Hertel-Fernandez, 2019) at the state-level. As James and Stewart (2022) write, however, “election-related bills were thrown into legislative hoppers at a historic rate in 2021, but they were not passed at a historic rate.” Thus, to what extent has election policymaking come to reflect position taking rather than efforts to alter the voting experience? When bills do come up for a vote, along what lines do legislators fall and are those lines dependent on context and content? How have the answers to both questions changed over time?

To that end, I conduct a novel and original data collection to identify roll call votes on election bills over the last 20 years. I then conduct an analysis aimed at differentiating position-taking versus serious efforts to alter how elections are run, focusing on both roll call voting and sponsorship behavior. I identify key players in crafting bills that are ultimately enacted and whether they serve on relevant legislative committees or party leaders. Furthermore, using multiple methods, I explore how these key players justify their proposals with an emphasis on whether they do so in principled terms mirroring the positions Democrats and Republicans have come to take on election policy or in more benign, normative terms.

Together, my findings underscore the theoretical contribution of this study: the decision to support or oppose restrictions to voter access reflect the strategic efforts of individual legislators to simultaneously benefit their party, respond to the interests of their constituency, and grapple with the political climate in which they serve.

Author

• Joseph Ryan Loffredo, Massachusetts Institute of Technology