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Why does the ruling party in Turkey institutionally weaken during democratic backsliding and autocratization? How did the personalization of politics under the cult of Erdoğan play a causal role in Turkey’s democratic erosion and authoritarian upgrading? The literature on dictatorships highlights the significance of institutionalized and strong ruling parties for maintaining regime consolidation through power-sharing and allocation of resources. In Turkey, however, the ruling AK Party deinstitutionalized and weakened in elections, legislative, and local levels as Turkey exited from democracy and established autocracy. Benefitting from the method of process tracing from 2011 to 2023, the paper argues that the sudden shocks threatening AK Party’s rule allowed personalization of politics to better handle the existential insecurity of the incumbent. This in turn, left the party less effective and less institutionalized. While the repression and executive aggrandizement of Erdoğan were imperative for him to remain in power, the de-institutionalization of the ruling party resulted in the weakening of the AK Party’s position in elections and parliament, disabling the incumbent to introduce a fully authoritarian system. Overall, Turkey’s transformation to a competitive authoritarian system through personalization prevented the country growing into a fully authoritarian regime due to the deterioration in party institutionalization.