The Law of Nations: What Multilateral Treaties and the Risk of Conflict

• In Event: International Organizations and Cooperation

Abstract

What features of global governance reduce the risk that a state will engage in militarized conflict? Past literature suggests that membership in International Governmental Organizations (IGOs) may have a pacifying effect. Empirically, this third leg of the Kantian tripod receives mixed support. More recent research acknowledges heterogeneity across IGOs in both scope and depth that clouds potential mechanisms linking IGO membership to peace. We offer an alternative measure of commitment to a “law of nations” that focuses on the structure of multilateral treaties. Using a new dataset on membership in multilateral treaties, specifically membership in substantive protocols with voluntary and demanding legal requirements, we propose a state-level measure for embeddedness in the International Institutional Order (IIO). States that are committed to the IIO should be more likely to use legal institutions before resorting to war or threats of violence. In the set of MIDs from 1980 to 2010, we find that greater embeddedness in the IIO is associated with a lower likelihood of MID initiation. When included in the same statistical models, the pacifying effect of IGO membership is weakened or rendered insignificant while the IIO embeddedness measure remains consistent. Based on these findings, we suggest further consideration of the role of multilateral agreements in constructing global governance and promoting order in international contexts.

Authors

• Duu (Jason) Renn, Messiah University

• Xinyuan Dai, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign