Effective yet Limited Effect of Public Deliberation in China

• In Event: Governing Information in China: Effects at Home and Abroad

Abstract

How can local governments in developing countries, constrained by limited resources and attention, swiftly identify and respond to the most pressing public demands? This paper posits that public deliberative platforms can be instrumental in this regard by facilitating essential communication between local elites and ordinary citizens, thereby enhancing citizen satisfaction in the short term. Specifically, public deliberation serves two functions. Firstly, it publicizes shifting societal issues, incentivizing bureaucrats to respond more promptly. Secondly, it generates narratives that temporarily improve the public perception of local governments, even among individuals not directly benefiting from government actions. To test the implications of our argument, we empirically examine a Chinese version of topical debate programs, wherein local officials engage with citizens and respond to their concerns. We exploit the variation of the initiation of topical debate programs across cities and time as the basis of a staggered Difference-in-Differences design. Empirical results suggest that, despite some programs being pre-recorded, those topical debate programs in China significantly enhance citizens’ trust in their local officials in the short run. Further, we provide supporting evidence for both the incentive effect and the narrative effect. These results together underscore the positive, albeit limited, role of public deliberation in developing countries when government resources and attention are constrained.

Authors

• Jidong Chen, Tsinghua University

• Yukun Wang, Renmin University of China

• Ming-ang Zhang, Central University of Finance and Economics

• Xingyu Zhou, University of Rochester