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Prior literature identifies two instrumental motives for electoral violence; to deter rivals from participating and to reinforce partisan identification along the primary cleavage of electoral contestation. We propose a third novel causal logic for violence; arguing that rather than serving as a tool to maintain existing lines of political conflict, violence can also be used disrupt the equilibrium axis of political contestation. Meaning, violence can be a powerful entry strategy for political entrepreneurs and/or used to displace the principal protagonists of electoral competition. We test our theory by developing distinct empirical implications for the actors, mechanisms, and causal pathways of violence: We expect that violence will be incited by new entrants or political losers around a politically dormant subordinate cleavage. The mechanism involves a boundary shift that alters the primary axis of political contestation. The causal pathways proceeds through several steps, starting with violence along a dormant cleavage, increased identification around this secondary identity, and increased social and eventually partisan polarisation around the newly established cleavage. Our empirical strategy is multi-method. We conduct original surveys with citizens who were exposed or not exposed to a violent religious rally. Second, we use a regression discontinuity in time design to compare vote shares in localities which witnessed violence before / after elections. Finally, through process tracing we enunciate the causal sequence of Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)'s use of violence for entry and consolidation in different states in India.