Deescalating an Accidental Crisis

• In Event: Searching for the Water’s Edge: Polarization and Foreign Policy

Abstract

Policymakers have expressed grave concerns over the risks of an accidental crisis between the United States and China. What could be done to deescalate such a crisis and reduce the risk of war? Direct theoretical and empirical guidance on this question is scarce. Existing literature suggests that publics in both countries are nationalistic and reward confrontation and displays of strength. We challenge this conclusion and argue that the accidental nature of a crisis in itself can help deescalate. We propose an interactive theory of crisis deescalation based on (1) attribution, where one side can send a public signal to shift, share, or take blame for the accident, and (2) response, where the other side can either accept or reject the attribution. We test our theory using parallel interactive survey experiments in the United States and China. We find that consistent with our argument, sharing blame between the two sides by calling a crisis an accident received the strongest approval from both American and Chinese citizens, especially when the other side also cooperates in accepting that it was an accident. Among US citizens, while calling a crisis an accident received strong bipartisan support, Republican voters are significantly more disapproving of their government taking responsibility for the accident. Our findings illuminate the political feasibilities of different pathways of deescalating an accidental crisis and reducing the risk of war.

Authors

• Kai Quek, University of Hong Kong

• Zenobia Chan, Georgetown University