Countering Parliamentary Decline or Counter Provoking Extremists?

• In Event: Contemporary Challenges of Democracy and Inclusive Growth

Abstract

Historically, extremist parties have engaged in a process of parliamentary disruption, violating the rules of interaction, and slowing down the legislative process. What is the response of democratic parties respond to these strategies? This paper examines these questions in the context of the Weimar parliament, the paradigmatical case of parliamentary breakdown. Using a novel dataset of all parliamentary interruptions that violated the proceedings of the Weimar parliament, I identify the strategies by which extremist parties sought to undermine parliamentary deliberations and the responses of Weimar's democratic parties to these interruptions. I document how mainstream parties relied on both individualized and collective sanctions against extremist parties, but that these strategies remained ineffective in stopping parliamentary erosion. The paper documents that legislators of mainstream democratic parties responded to the provocation of extremists using strategies of 'counterprovocation' and identifies the main electoral considerations explaining the decisions of deputies of mainstream parties to engage in these strategies.

Author

• Isabela Mares, Yale University