Asymmetric Backlash against Coal Phase-Out: Evidence from Europe

• In Event: Political Preferences and Divides

Abstract

In recent years, the European Union announced ambitious climate targets including the Fit for 55 and the European Green New Deal. The exit from coal power generation plays an essential role in meeting the EU's commitments. While transitions away from coal offer substantial climate benefits, the closure of coal power plants can pose an economic threat at the local level as power plants offer decent employment opportunities and significant tax revenues. How do coal phase-out processes shape political attitudes and behavior of voters in regions with coal-fired power plants? Existing studies highlight that various green policy such as wind turbine construction and a ban on polluting cars lead to the electoral backlash against the incumbent government mainly out of pocketbook concerns (Stokes, 2016; Colantone et al., 2022). While climate policy is an important domestic issue, it is also closely associated with international institutions such as the European Union and the United Nations with their clear progressive positions on decarbonization. Yet, we know very little about how coal phase-out affects voters' attitudes toward international cooperation to tackle climate change. To fill this gap, this paper studies how the decommission of local coal-fired power plants change attitudes toward the European Union that has been a main proponent of the green agendas in Europe. Understanding political impacts of coal phase-out and potential support for the Green New Deal in the most affected European regions bears significant policy implications for the ongoing Green Transition.

I argue that the shut-down of coal power plants leads to an asymmetric backlash against the European Union in affected coal power regions. Although voters in coal power regions suffer from common economic losses potentially stemming from lost local tax revenues, they may or may not appreciate environmental benefits from the power plant closures. Voters who are initially less worried about climate change perceive low climate benefits and high economic losses from the decommission of power plants. In contrast, voters who are more sympathetic to the Green Transition tend to perceive sociotropic values from reduced carbon emissions, which can partly offset negative economic consequences.

To test these claims, I draw on a novel dataset on coal-fired power plant closures between 2005 and 2019 across 15 European countries from Beyond Fossils as well as individual-level attitudes toward the EU from the ESS and NUTS3-level election data from the NED. Based on previous research, I focus on heterogeneity between left-wing and right-wing voters who have substantially different views about climate change. Using a difference-in-differences design, I show that coal plant closures lead to a political backlash among voters who put less priority on climate change policy. After the retirement of coal power plants, conservative voters and regions are more likely to support anti-EU positions than left-wing voters and regions. Drawing on German panel data with precise information about voters' concern about climate change in a pre-treatment period, I show that initial views about climate change condition the affiliation with the AfD after the decommission of power plants, controlling for time-invariant individual-level characteristics.

Finally, I shed light on mechanisms. Relying on the Gallup World Poll data, I show that voters in affected regions tend to express stronger dissatisfaction with local public services but their perceptions about the local economy are not significantly affected. This evidence suggests that reduced tax revenues from coal plant closures provide primary sources of economic grievances. Next, I examine why left-wing voters would not punish the EU despite a decline in the quality of public services. Preliminary evidence from the ESS round 8 suggests that ideological concerns may play an essential role: left-wing voters exposed to power plant closures are more likely to believe that power should be generated more from renewable energy resources and less from coal than moderate and right-wing voters. In contrast, all voters across the ideological spectrum are similarly dissatisfied with (i) their personal and national economic situation and (ii) national government and parliament. These results suggest that differences in general economic and political dissatisfaction may not be driving divergent attitudes toward the EU after the closures of power plants.

Author

• Sung In Kim, Harvard University