Do Drones Help Dictators?

• In Event: Protests and Violence in Democracies & Autocracies

Abstract

Armed drones have proven to be effective in various security contexts. During the Ukraine and Russian War, Ukraine targeted the Russian Navy base at Novorossiisk in the Black Sea, showcasing the operational capabilities of armed drones (Tim Lister et al., 2023). Additionally, in a notable incident, the United States targeted and killed Qasem Soleimani, the commander of the Revolutionary Guards of Iran, utilizing armed drones (Zachary et al., 2020). Furthermore, Pakistan has employed the US drone program for counter-terrorism efforts (Mir and Moore, 2019).

Many existing literatures debate the effectiveness of armed drones, contending that they offer advantages in interstate war (Lin-Greenberg, 2022; Kunertova, 2023a, 2023b; Calcara 2022a, 2022b), counter-terrorism, and civil war (Schwartz et al, 2022; Mir and Moore, 2019; Johnston and Sarbahi, 2016; Bauer et al 2022). They contend that these advantages are caused from characteristics of armed drone such as low cost, small size and unmanned characteristics. However, despite the widespread domestic use of drones due to their dual-use characteristics and numerous instances of their application in domestic contexts, there is limited research on the relationship between armed drones and domestic unrest. Notably, there is a lack of empirical research addressing this specific question.

To address these gaps, this research aims to analyze whether armed drones effectively reduce domestic unrest, particularly instances of riots, within autocratic regimes. This inquiry is motivated by two primary considerations: 1) autocracies often seek armed drones for the purpose of "remote control repression," and 2) the acquisition of armed drones may induce a collective action problem by heightening the perceived risks associated with participating in riots. According to instrumentalist logic, potential participants weigh the cost and benefit associated with participating in domestic unrest. Armed drone can elevate the cost of potential participants because of surveillance and repression capabilities. Therefore, potential participants hesitate participation of domestic unrest, so collective action problem arises.

To verify this argument, I collect domestic unrest and armed drone data and use difference in difference estimator with multiple time periods. As a result of empirical analysis, armed drone acquisition will effectively decrease the number of riots, not demonstration. This is because participants of demonstration face lower cost than participants of riot, if they get arrested or suppressed. This result contributes to understanding drone effectiveness in a new domain, especially domestic unrest. Moreover, it suggests that armed drones can be employed as effective tools of repression by autocratic regimes. Therefore, it has policy implications about regulation and monitoring of armed drone technics.

Author

• Youngsang Lee