Intra-Party Powersharing: Theory and Evidence from Norway

• In Event: Transatlantic Advances in the Study of Party Factions

Abstract

Despite their recognized importance, intra-party negotiations’ inherently opaque nature poses empirical challenges to understand how parties share power internally. We study how parties allocate positions on their list to different factions. Theoretically, we develop a bargaining model to study how these decisions vary depending on the stakes of the election---the sensitivity of party resources to the electoral performance. We then empirically evaluate these implications using data from Norwegian municipal elections. We exploit unique features of the electoral systems and a wave of municipal mergers to geographically identify candidates' factional membership and how parties prioritized the election of certain candidates. In line with our theory's functionalist logic, we show that smaller factions are over-compensated in terms of list positions, especially in `safe' ranks.

Authors

• Christine Bangum, BI Business School

• Jon H. Fiva, Norwegian Business School

• Giovanna Maria Invernizzi, Bocconi University

• Carlo Prato, Columbia University

• Janne Tukiainen, University of Turku