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In an ideal democracy, political parties compete by providing distinct ideological packages to voters. Yet, after election day, strong ideological differences risk impeding the implementation of timely and effective policies, especially needed during economic crises. To what extent does increasing polarization hinder a government’s ability to respond to these types of crises? In this paper, we combine national financial data and election manifesto data from 45 countries around the world to show that governments are less likely to consolidate the economy after a crisis if the party system is highly polarized. More importantly, this effect is equally strong regardless of whether the party conflict stems from disagreement on economic or cultural political positions. This suggests that the increasingly multi-dimensional nature of the political space might make political systems less likely to reach compromises during times of crisis and more likely to let emerging problems remain unsolved.