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In recent years political theorists have engaged in a lively debate on the proper relationship of theory and practice, as well as of the role of political philosophy within public policy. Whereas analytic political philosophers had traditionally held that theory did not have to be action guiding, this consensus has been fundamentally challenged by so-called “political realists,” who argue that political theory should have a more direct relation to “real politics” (Geuss 2008), supporters of democratic underl-labouring, who think that political philosophers should use their tools to help democratic citizens gain clarity about the full implications of their political choices (Swift and White 2008), as well as public philosophers, who engage with public policy directly by acting as political advisors or sitting on government commissions (Wolff 2011). While continental thinkers agree that theory should not be completely separate from politics, leading exponents of this approach – such as Jean-Paul Sartre and Jürgen Habermas have tended to bridge the gap between theory and practice more indirectly, by acting as public intellectuals (Verovšek 2021).
Although Hannah Arendt famously denied that she was a political philosopher, preferring the term political theorist instead, she never laid out her thoughts on the relationship of theory to practice. Although she clearly opposed Martin Heidegger’s interventions in support of the Nazi regime and identified bad political judgment as a déformation professionnelle of the philosopher, it is unclear if political theorists share this deformation or what role they should play in public life. Despite Arendt’s lack of direct engagement with this theme, her work is clearly relevant to these debates. Not only did she identify comprehension, defined as the “unpremeditated, attentive facing up to, and resisting of, reality” as the fundamental task of political theory (1958, vii-viii), many of her writings were published in public-facing forums directed at a general audience, not just to other academic political theorists. However, while Arendt in many ways appears to fulfill the role of a public intellectual, in many of her comments she is also very disparaging of intellectuals.
This paper draws on my past work on public intellectuals (Verovšek 2021; forthcoming) to think about what Arendt’s writings can tell us about her view of the relationship of theory and practice. I argue that Arendt’s work implies that in contrast to the philosopher, who on her account considers timeless questions in the abstract, engagement with contemporary political questions lies at the heart of her account of political theory.