Thoughtlessness and Social Acceleration

• In Event: Arendt between Past and Future

Abstract

This paper theorizes that the phenomenon of social acceleration, diagnosed by Rosa (2015), exacerbates and intensifies the social pathology of thoughtlessness conceptualized by Arendt (1977, 1978). This paper develops its argument in two parts. The first examines the nature of thought and thoughtlessness, drawing on recent work to systematize those concepts. The second analyses how social acceleration may not only aggravate existing causes of thoughtlessness but also introduce new ones. The conclusion discusses why moral and political thinkers should be concerned about the potential exacerbation of thoughtlessness caused by social acceleration.

Arendt, in her various writings (1977, 2003), argued that thought/thinking was a prerequisite for developing one’s moral personality, identity, and autonomy (see also Bernstein 2006, Ophir 1996, Schupmann 2014, Lederman 2019). She concluded that thinking was essential for realizing one’s full humanity (1958). However, Arendt worried that late twentieth century mass society was progressively eroding our capacity to think. This erosion occurs because of two processes. First, mass society intrudes into and breaks down the private sphere, which provides individuals the space to deliberate about moral issues for themselves. Second, mass society increases pressures for conformism – akin to democratic despotism – and reduces exposure to human plurality, depriving individuals of the different perspectives crucial to thinking and deliberation. Individuals are increasingly lonely and isolated (Rensmann 2014). Overall, these changes present a serious challenge to cultivating one’s identity and autonomy, resulting in individual moral “un-responsibility” (Hayden 2009, Schiff 2012, Burdman 2019).

Rosa (2015) analyses how two forms of social acceleration impact the formation of identity in late modernity: the acceleration of social change and the acceleration of the pace of life. The former leads to the problem of “slipping slopes,” as individuals are unable to take initiative and execute considered life plans, rendering them passive and objectified in the face of rapid social changes and revolutions. With the latter, individuals are increasing under the “tyranny of the moment” and pressured to effectively live faster. Overall, social acceleration causes individuals to increasingly view themselves from the “third-person perspective,” i.e. as objects controlled by external forces and whose identity is situational and contingent (Bilgrami 2006, Schupmann 2014), leading to what Benjamin (1974) describes as “a loss of experience.”

I argue that these pathologies of social acceleration not only exacerbate existing causes of thoughtlessness but also introduce new ones. They increasingly erode the private sphere, accelerating the loss of the space and time to cultivate one’s identity and moral personality. As the self becomes more situational and contingent, the sense of loneliness and isolation will undoubtedly increase. Furthermore, acceleration challenges the conception of oneself as an agent, increasing the likelihood of conforming to external forces without considering their moral implications. Social and political thinkers should be alarmed by factors that exacerbate thoughtlessness. Arendt – supported empirically by Milgram (1963, 2009) – argued that thoughtlessness enabled a new form of radical evil, at mass scale. As society becomes increasingly characterized by isolation and loneliness, it becomes easier for totalitarians to seize control of it. She was also concerned that thoughtlessness enabled social engineering through behaviorism. By diagnosing this social pathology, this paper makes an initial step towards addressing this critical issue of our time.

Author

• Benjamin A. Schupmann, Yale-NUS College