A Model and Evidence of Bureaucratic Repression in Russia

• In Event: State Repression and Human Rights

Abstract

How do bureaucrats make decisions as agents of repression? Central governments use bureaucratic agents to administer repressive policies; one of the more obvious examples is requirements that civilians obtain permits to protest. In making decisions to approve or deny, bureaucrats must consider more than the repressive orders from the central government. They compete with other bureaucrats at the same level of authority for the attention of the central government, which promises promotions and other benefits. We present a delegation model with a single principal with preferences for information on bureaucratic quality and social order (like the government in Lorentzen (2013)) and multiple agents competing for favor from that government, deriving implications as to when bureaucrats will approve or deny more pro- and anti-Putin protests. We test the implications of the model with a dataset of all permit approvals and denials over three days of massive anti-Putin protest in Russia

Authors

• Emily Hencken Ritter, Vanderbilt University

• Katerina Tertytchnaya, University of Oxford