Historical Memory, Identity, and ‘Sovereignty’ in Sikh Politics in Punjab-India

• In Event: Nationalism, Communalism, and Hindu-Muslim Relations in South Asia

Abstract

In this paper, I attempt to answer the interrelated research questions: “What is the historical/theological basis for the demand for a sovereign Sikh state (Khalistan) and, more importantly, why/when does this demand periodically reemerge in modern Sikh politics?” Thus, this paper has both descriptive and explanatory components. These intertwined research questions are important due to the increasing marginalization of Sikh “moderates” and the apparent ascendance of Sikh “radicals” in contemporary Sikh politics, portending friction (and potential violence) with the central Indian state. I argue that the concept of “sovereignty” is a deeply embedded and permanent feature within Sikh “historical memory” and collective political conscience, but that its periodic reemergence is contingent on the nature of factional political competition within the Sikh community in Punjab.

I approach the paper’s main research question by integrating both the instrumentalist and primordialist perspectives to the study of ethnic/national identity. That is, ethnic and national identities are fluid and evolving social phenomenon as emphasized by the instrumentalists, but also of great emotional significance to individuals/groups as argued by the primordialists. The theoretical significance of the paper lies in its utilization of “historical memory” and “contested identity” in explaining “the politics of people-building.” The role of “historical memory” is central to the formation of ethnic/national groups, specifically because ethnic/national elites utilize/adopt competing narratives and “constitutive stories” of “history” and “peoplehood” to build their preferred sense of community cohesion and loyalty. This process of “people-building” is a competitive one that requires leaders to be wary of competing historical narratives, and always advance their own preferred narrative as being more legitimate and advantageous over those of other leaders/factions within “their” group. Thus, in the attempt to build a “community” with a common identity, existing identities are consistently renegotiated.

This empirical theme is important because India is a developing multi-ethnic (or “multi-national”) democracy whose unity rests on the success of twin, intertwined processes of “nation-building” and “state-building.” Yet, the continuation of ethnic/sub-state nationalist secessionism along India’s peripheral borders demonstrates that this process of “state-nation building” has not been fully successful, despite the Indian state’s efforts over the past seven decades. Sections of numerous ethnic/sub-state national groups—including the Kashmiri Muslims, Sikhs of the Punjab, and various “ethnic” groups in the Northeast including the “ethnic Assamese,” Nagas, Mizos, and Meiteis—have demanded separation from India. Similar dynamics also exist in a multiplicity of other countries---both developed and postcolonial developing---including the Baloch in Pakistan, the Tamils in Sri Lanka, the Kurds in Syria and Iraq, the Basques and Catalans in Spain, Quebec in Canada, and the Scots in Great Britain. Thus, this paper, while focusing on the role of “historical memory” and “contested identity” in the Sikh case in Punjab-India, has significant relevance to other cases in a comparative and theoretical context.

The core of the paper’s empirical data consists of over a dozen interviews with Sikh leaders of various political parties and organizations in Punjab conducted in December 2023 and January 2024, supplemented with interviews found in the popular press. Through these original field interviews, I specifically try to probe these leaders’ sense of “historical memory,” and ascertain their views on the nature of Sikh identity (i.e., whether Sikhs are a “religious community,” an “ethnic community” or potentially a “nation” with legitimate demands for self-determination), and the actual/desired relationship of the Sikhs with the wider Punjabi regional and Indian “national” identities. These interviews include those with Sikh leaders in the Hindu-nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) who generally view Sikhs as a part of the wider Hindu family and unequivocally “Indian;” leaders in the secular-nationalist Congress Party who prefer regulating religious identity to the private sphere and view all people residing in the borders of India including Sikhs as “Indian;” leadership of the moderate Sikh-based Akali Dal (Badal) who view Sikhs as being a distinct Panth or quam (community/nation) but still an integral part of the “Indian mainstream;” leaders of the “radical” Akali Dal (United) who view Sikhs as a separate quam which should be allowed to continually renegotiate their relationship with the Indian Union; and leaders of the comparatively more overly “radical/separatist” Akali Dal (Mann-Amritsar) and Dal Khalsa who view Sikhs as a sovereign “nation” worthy of “self-determination” and an independent Sikh state.

Author

• Jugdep S. Chima, Hiram College