Democratic Accountability: Citizen-Elite Relations under Incumbent Disadvantage

• In Event: Promoting Peace and Democratic Stability in Divided African Societies

Abstract

Existing literature on incumbent dis(advantage) in developing democracies offers insights into elite behaviour, albeit with conflicting perspectives. Pessimists contend that incumbent disadvantage negatively impacts governance by incentivizing corruption among elites. The anticipation of being voted out may drive elites to embezzle public funds. Conversely, optimists argue that incumbent disadvantage motivates elected representatives to fulfill promises for political survival. However, the exploration of how incumbency disadvantage shapes citizen-elite interaction remains relatively limited. This paper posits that representatives facing incumbent disadvantage are more susceptible to citizen pressure. This assertion rests on the logic that voters in competitive constituencies can easily influence electoral outcomes, enabling them to leverage their votes for increased demands on representatives. Using a dataset that merges respondents in geocoded Afrobarometer data with the Constituency Level Elections Archive data (CLEA), this paper demonstrates that voters in competitive constituencies are more likely to contact their representatives. Additionally, it shows implications for co-ethnic trust and trust towards other ethnic groups, as competitive constituencies are less likely to have a single dominant ethnic group.

Author

• Rasheed Ibrahim, University of Notre Dame