The Curse of the Mandate of Heaven: A Model of Power Centralization

• In Event: Formal Models of Autocratic Politics

Abstract

Europe and China followed divergent paths of development during the premodern period. Europe nurtured representative institutions and secure property rights that facilitated the rise of modern capitalism, whereas the growth of commercial interests in China was persistently stifled. The divergence can be attributed, at least in part, to the more centralized power structure of the Chinese state at the dawn of the premodern era. To account for this distinction, I propose that China’s early adoption of the Mandate of Heaven, a merit-based political philosophy aimed at legitimizing imperial rule in a secular society, inadvertently contributed to the cyclical overturning of dynasties and a steady trend of power centralization towards the emperor. In substantiating this argument, I develop a game-theoretical model of authoritarian power sharing, demostrating that the threat of peasant revolution can alter the initial power distribution between the ruler and the elite, tilting the equilibrium more in favor of the ruler and leading to a less balanced power structure. I also present historical narratives to corroborate and contextualize this finding.

Author

• Shuyi Yu