Countering Coercion by Reassuring Domestic Audience: China’s Nuclear Policy

• In Event: Deterrence and Coercion

Abstract

Given its arsenal’s small size and vulnerability, China’s nuclear strategy is usually characterized as minimum deterrence or assured retaliation. Few scholars have noted the evolving nature of this subject. This article argues that China did not have a nuclear deterrence strategy during the Cold War. Its policy goal was not to deter nuclear attacks but to counter coercion from its superpower adversaries. Nuclear war was not a credible threat, whereas coercive diplomacy backed by nuclear weapons was the primary security threats China was facing. The acquisition of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, despite being crude and less advanced, provides the regime to direct a propaganda about China’s nuclear sword. Chinese nuclear arsenal did not seek strike accuracy or credibility in the eyes of opponents. It primarily messaged to domestic audience. The belief that China was nuclear capable to counterstrike makes domestic audience psychologically immune to adversaries’ coercive threats. Providing reassurance and certainty to domestic audience was the main task of China’s nuclear program. Successfully doing so renders China free of nuclear threats since 1969. Countering coercion better describes the characteristics of Chinese nuclear force and captures the logic of its nuclear policy during the Cold War.

Author

• Hongyu Zhang, University of North Carolina at Wilmington