Helping or Hindering? Outcomes of US Counterinsurgency (COIN) Intervention

• In Event: Foreign Policy Meddling

Abstract

Post World War II, the U.S. has been the most prolific intervener in intra-state conflicts. This intervention is often to provide COIN support to weak, conflict-affected states. Despite the prevalence of U.S. COIN support in the international system, there has been limited, large-N analysis of how U.S. COIN support affects conflict outcomes in an affected state. We fill the gap by offering empirical evidence of the near-term effect of U.S. COIN support on intrastate conflict outcomes and its long-term impacts on state capacity of affected states. To pursue this study, we developed an original dataset on U.S. military interventions and the outcomes of insurgencies since 1945. Results show that while U.S. COIN support was useful for defeating insurgents in affected states, such intervention hinders state capacity in the long term. We argue this failure is largely attributable to the lack of understanding of local context. We further test this theory by empirically examining the impacts of U.S. COIN intervention in Afghanistan. This study provides important policy implications for the government to take steps to refine its counterinsurgency strategy.

Authors

• Zinab Attai, Cornell University

• Songtao Duan, Pennsylvania State University